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FIGHTING BACHA BAZI: PROTECTING THE DANCING BOYS AND 
IMPLEMENTING THE LEAHY LAWS IN AFGANISTAN 
William Badinelli1 
INTRODUCTION 
In September 2015, the New York Times (the “Times”) reported that child sexual abuse 
committed by Afghan security forces was “rampant”, naming specific Afghan commanders and 
militia leaders alleged to have committed abuse, as well as U.S. troops who reported the 
incidents.2 Following the Times’ report, a bipartisan group of ninety-three members of Congress 
requested that the Special Inspector for Afghanistan Reconstruction (“SIGAR”) inquire into the 
United States government’s experience with allegations of child sexual abuse committed by 
members of the Afghan security forces.3 The members also requested that SIGAR inquire into 
the manner in which the Leahy laws of the Department of Defense (“DOD” or “Defense 
Department”) and the U.S. Department of State (“State” or “State Department”) are implemented 
in Afghanistan.4 
Under bacha bazi, boys are raped and forced into sexual slavery.5 The United States 
government has been reluctant to confront bacha bazi for fear of isolating Afghan allies in the 
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the law school’s Advanced Writing Requirement. Thank you Professor Jonathan Hafetz for 
the feedback and comments throughout the drafting of this paper. 
2 Joseph Goldstein, U.S. Soldiers Told to Ignore Sexual Abuse of Boys by Afghan Allies, THE 
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5 Alice Noman, The Tragedy of the Dancing Boys in Afghanistan: The US Silence on Bacha 
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North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (“NATO”) fight against the Taliban.6 This 
noninterventionist policy is against the purported values of the United States and undermines is 
security mission in Afghanistan. Additionally, as the Afghan government is unable to prevent 
bacha bazi, due to inaction and inability, it falls on the United States to confront and combat the 
practice. In this paper, I will argue that Afghan security forces that are funded, trained by, and 
operate alongside the U.S. military are subject to prosecution by the DOD for gross violations of 
human rights under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (“UCMJ”) where there is credible 
information that the violation occurred. In Part I, I will discuss the history and culture of bacha 
bazi in Afghanistan, as well the Afghan government’s enabling of the culture. In Part II, I will 
detail the history of the Leahy laws. In Part III I will argue that the DOD prosecution of Afghan 
security forces for human rights violations is permissible under U.S. law (the Leahy laws), and 
how to reconcile the framework of this thesis with the bilateral agreements governing American 
use of force in Afghanistan. Part III will also briefly touch upon international prosecution and 
why it is an inappropriate venue. Part IV will recommend the policy proposal of Congress 
creating a private right to action under the Leahy laws. In sum, this paper will show how the 
revision and strengthening of the Leahy laws may be utilized to curb bacha bazi. 
I. BACHA BAZI AND AFGHANISTAN 
a. Bacha Bazi Defined 
The term bacha bazi translates into “boy play”.7 The practice involves bacha baz – “boy 
players” – men who enslave young boys.8 These men are wealthy merchants, government officials, 
                                                        
6 Goldstein, supra note 2. 
7 Samuel V. Jones, Ending Bacha Bazi: Boy Sex Slavery and the Responsibility to Protect 
Doctrine, 25 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 63, 66 (2015) 
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or those belonging to militias. 9  Bacha bazi boys are usually poverty-stricken and without 
relatives.10 Sometimes, poor families will sell their sons to a bacha baz, or allow their son to be 
“adopted”, in exchange for clothing, food, or money.11 Other boys are kidnapped in public places 
such as the market.12 Bacha bazi boys are forced to dress as females, wear makeup, and dance for 
parties of men, where they are sexually exploited.13 If they do not please their observers, they can 
be beaten.14 The boys are then sold to the highest bidding observer or shared between Afghan 
men.15  
Bacha bazi inflicts numerous psychological scars on the boys.16 These boy slaves refer to their 
masters as “My Lord.”17 It is rare for victims to attempt escape or report their abusers, due to threat 
of being killed, their family members being murdered, and the taboo of homosexuality in 
Afghanistan.18 
b. The Progression of Bacha Bazi 
Bacha bazi has become a “shockingly” common practice across Afghanistan’s southern rural 
areas and northern countryside.19 The Mujahideen warlords who fought off the Soviets invasion 
in the 1980s regularly engaged in child sexual abuse.20 Keeping boy conscripts around for personal 
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service and sexual relations became a status symbol.21 Bacha bazi was banned when the Taliban 
came into power in 1996.22 Enacting strict Sharia law, bacha bazi became taboo, and those who 
practiced it engaged in secret.23 Punishments for violation of Islamic law included flagellation, 
amputation, and execution.24 
When the United State military invaded Afghanistan in 2001, it succeeded in toppling the 
Taliban in coordination with the Northern Alliance, a collection of former mujahideen 
commanders that later returned to power after the Taliban’s defeat. In returning to power, the 
warlords revived the practice of bacha bazi: boys were kidnapped and raped and forced into sexual 
slavery by empowered predators.25 Afghan families with a bounty of children are eager to provide 
a child to the regional warlord or official – knowing the sexual consequences – in order to gain 
wealth or preferential treatment.26 
c. Islam and Bacha Bazi 
Islam, the official religion of Afghanistan, prohibits homosexuality.27 Despite the prohibition, 
cultural interpretations of Islamic scripture allows sexual abusers to avoid the penalties. 28  A 
relaxed view of Islam means that that loving a boy would be a sin, whereas simply using the boy 
for sexual pleasure is something different.29 More specifically, while the act is undesirable, it is 
                                                        
21 Id. 
22 Stephanie Ng, The Last Taboo: Male Rape and the Effectiveness of Existing Legislation in 
Afghanistan, Great Britain, and the United States, 23 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 227, 229 
(2014). 
23 Mondloch, supra note 19. 
24 Ng, supra note 22 at 229. 
25 Mondloch, supra note 19. 
26 Id. 
27 Ng, supra note 22 at 233. 
28 U.S. Army, Human Terrain Team, Pashtun Sexuality, PUB. INTELLIGENCE, 
https://info.publicintelligence.net/HTT-PashtunSexuality.pdf. 
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far preferential to sex with an ineligible woman, a sin which would likely result in revenge or 
honor killing.30 Additionally, due to their rural setting and inability to speak Arabic – the language 
of Islamic texts – Afghans allow social customs to govern over religious values, including the 
verses of the Quran banning homosexuality.31 
In sum, the tradition of bacha bazi has become a significant problem throughout Afghanistan 
following the U.S. invasion in 2001. Both Islam and Afghan cultural interpretation of the Koran 
have failed to prevent this system of sexual servitude and exploitation. The Afghan government 
has also failed to confront and prevent perpetrators of bacha bazi.32 Therefore, it has fallen to the 
U.S. government to confront child sexual abuse committed by Afghan security forces, a task the 
United States has failed to adequately accomplish. 
II. THE LEAHY LAWS 
 The Leahy laws govern U.S. assistance to foreign military forces; these laws require the 
Departments of Defense and State to halt funding to troops where there is information of human 
rights violations. This section explores the background behind Congress’ enactment of the Leahy 
laws, the standard Leahy vetting procedures, and how the U.S. government has failed to implement 
the laws in regards to funding of Afghan security forces. 
a. Background 
In 1997, Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont introduced a bill that limited funding for training 
in regards to nations with histories of human rights abuses.33 The legislation arose from Senator 
                                                        
30 Id. (these killings are a Pashtun requirement rather than Islamic, though they are linked 
in the minds of rural Afghan villagers). 
31 Mondloch, supra note 19. 
32 See section III(b)(c)(d). 
33 Major Michael J. O’Connor, Bangladesh Rapid Action Battalion: Satisfying the 
Requirements of the Leahy Amendments with a Rule of Law Approach, 215 MIL. L. REV. 182, 
186 (2013) 
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Leahy’s, as well as other members’ of Congress, concern that recipients of American military 
funding were using the funding to support oppressive governments in South America.34 
The Leahy laws trace their roots back to the School of the Americas (“SOA”), a facility 
founded by the U.S. Army to enhance partner forces’ capabilities through the training of military 
officers and non-commissioned officers of South American and Central American forces.35 The 
school had trained over 60,000 students in military tactics such as infantry tactics, foreign internal 
defense, and international human rights.36 U.S. funding of foreign military troops became an issue 
after the “Massacre at El Mozote”, where Salvadoran troops fired upon the village of El Mozote, 
killing hundreds of men, women and children.37 Following reports that the massacre involved 
graduates of the SOA, an advocacy group named SOA Watch formed to track human rights abuses 
by SOA graduates.38 Senator Leahy’s legislation was originally adopted as an amendment to the 
Foreign Operations Act of 1997, and provides that the State Department has the primary 
responsibility that Leahy law restrictions are applied to foreign military funding.39 
Subsections (a) and (c) of § 2378d of Title 22 of the United States Code state: 
(a) No assistance shall be furnished under this chapter of the Arms Export Control Act to any 
unit of the security forces of a foreign country if the Secretary of State has credible 
information that such unit has committed a gross violation of human rights; 
(c) In the event the funds are withheld from any unit pursuant to this section, the Secretary of 
state shall promptly inform the foreign government of the basis for such action and shall, to 
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37 Id. at 187. 
38 Id. 
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the maximum extent practicable, assist the foreign government in taking effecting measures to 
bring the responsible members of the security forces to justice.40  
DOD’s corresponding Leahy law is specified in section 362 of Title 10 of the United States 
Code. DOD is prohibited from using any funds for “any training, equipment, or other assistance 
for a unit of a foreign security force if the Secretary of Defense has credible information that the 
unit has committed a gross violation of human rights.”41 The law requires the Defense Secretary, 
in consultation with the Secretary of State, to “ensure that prior to a decision to provide any 
training, equipment, or other assistance to a unit of a foreign security force full consideration is 
given to any credible information available to the Department of State relating to human rights 
violations by such unit.”42 Prior to 2014, the DOD Leahy law appeared as a provision in the annual 
DOD appropriation. 43  This earlier version prohibited DOD from using funds to support any 
training program involving a unit of the security forces or police of a foreign country if the Defense 
Secretary has received credible information from the State Department that the unit has committed 
a gross violation of human rights.44 The change of language in 2014 expanded the DOD Leahy 
law prohibition from applying only training programs to applying to any kind of DOD assistance 
for foreign security forces. 
Despite the DOD and State language, neither departments’ Leahy law define “gross violation 
of human rights” or “credible information”. According to DOD and State guidance, the 
departments rely upon the definition of “gross violation of human rights” as defined in § 
                                                        
40 22 U.S.C. § 2378(a)(c). 
41 10 U.S.C. 362(a)(1) 
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43 SIGAR, supra note 3 at 2 n. 5; see e.g. Consol. and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 
2013, Pub. L. No. 113-6, Div. C, § 8057. 
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502B(d)(1) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.45 According to the Foreign Assistance Act, the 
term “gross violations of internationally recognized human rights” includes, “torture or cruel, 
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, prolonged detention without charges and trial, 
causing the disappearance of persons by the abduction and clandestine detention of those persons, 
and other flagrant denial of the right to life, liberty, or the security of the person”.46 Both DOD and 
State view sexual assault of children as a gross violation of human rights.47 
b. Leahy Laws Vetting Procedures 
DOD and State typically follow a standard vetting process. The process begins with the State’s 
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (“DRL”) vets all candidates for assistance 
through its International Vetting and Security Tracking (“INVEST”) system to determine whether 
there is credible information of a gross violation of human rights before providing funding.48 A 
Leahy vetting request is approved if no derogatory information is found on either the unit or the 
individual during the search. 49 A request is canceled for administrative reasons unrelated to 
derogatory information; a request is suspended if the preliminary vetting search identifies possible 
derogatory information; a request is rejected if confirmed derogatory information is found.50 
In July 2014, DOD and State established separate procedures unique to Afghanistan.51 For new 
recruits, initial vetting is done by the Afghan authorities using their own vetting process; in the 
absence of a specific request for assistance, DOD and State do not vet every member of a unit 
                                                        
45 SIGAR, supra note 3 at 4. 
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48 Id. at 5. 
49 Id. at 5 n. 16. 
50 Id. 
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receiving assistance.52 The U.S. will vet under two circumstances: (1) when individual Afghans 
are to receive training in the U.S., and; (2) when a gross violation of human rights is reported and 
DOD and State attempt to identify the units and troops responsible.53 
c. U.S. Implementation of the Leahy Laws in Afghanistan is Ineffective. 
The U.S. government has taken on a policy of inaction and ignorance over human rights 
violations committed by Afghan security forces funded by DOD and State. As of September 2016, 
DRL had conducted 18,768 Leahy vetting requests for Afghan security forces since 2010; this 
includes 5,753 requests from DOD, and of those, 4,818 were approved, 284 were canceled, 651 
suspended, and none rejected.54 From 2010 to 2016, the U.S. military asked to review Afghan 
military units to see if there were any instances of gross violations of human rights abuse on 5,753 
occasions; not once was funding cut off. 55  U.S. funding of Afghan security forces continue 
unabated, despite the fact that as of August 2016, DOD was tracking seventy-five reported human 
rights violations, seven of which involved child sexual assault.56 In addition to the reported child 
sexual assaults, DOD and State have determined that there was credible information of gross 
violation of human rights for twenty-three of forty-six incidents not involving child abuse, such as 
extrajudicial killings and torture.57 In many of these cases, DOD has used what is called the 
                                                        
52 Id. (as many members of the Afghan security forces do not have birth certificates and 
some names are common, State does not have baseline information on many Afghan 
security force members; it would be a waste to enter all new recruits into INVEST). 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 5. 
55 Rod Norland, Afghan Pedophiles Get Free Pass from U.S. Military, Report Says, THE NEW 
YORK TIMES (Jan. 23, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/23/world/asia/afghanistan-military-abuse.html. 
56 SIGAR, supra note 3 at 13. 
57 Id. at 14. 
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“notwithstanding clause” of the Defense Appropriations Act to continue to funding Afghan 
security forces which have been implicated in gross violations of human rights.58  
Since the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (the “ASFF”) was established in 2005, Congress 
has made appropriations to the ASFF subject to the requirement that funds “shall be available to 
the Secretary of Defense, notwithstanding any other provision of law”.59 This notwithstanding 
clause has allowed the U.S. government to circumvent the Leahy laws and continue funding for 
training, equipment, and other assistance, to units confirmed to have committed gross violations 
of human rights.60 Additionally, the commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan is authorized to 
petition for expanded application of the notwithstanding clause for Afghan security forces 
implicated in human rights violations.61 The notwithstanding clause allows the U.S. government 
to continue funding sexual predators and human rights violators, undermining our nation’s 
commitment to human rights and liberties. The SIGAR report recommends that DOD stop using 
the notwithstanding clause to avoid Leahy law implementation, and, in a positive step, a U.S. 
Senate draft defense appropriation bill in the Senate backs SIGAR’s recommendation.62 
III. ANALYSIS 
Bacha bazi boys are raped and forced into sexual slavery by older, powerful Afghan men, such 
as warlords and government officials.63 Both DOD and State view child sexual assault as a “gross 
violation of human rights” as defined under the Foreign Assistance Act’s defined use of the term. 
                                                        
58 Norland, supra note 55. 
59 SIGAR, supra note 3 at 3; see Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, 
the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231, 235-36; 
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113, 129 Stat. 2242, 2385-86 
(2016). 
60 Id. at 15. 
61 Id. at 16. 
62 Norland, supra note 55. 
63 Jones, supra note 7 at 66. 
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Therefore, the Leahy laws govern Afghan security forces engaged in bacha bazi. The DOD Leahy 
law must be enhanced in order to punish sexual predators and bring an end to bacha bazi. 
Specifically language should be added to § 362 that mirrors the language of State’s Leahy law § 
2378d(c). Under this new framework, the clause § 362(a)(3) would state: 
(3) In the event that funds are withheld from any unit pursuant to this section, the Secretary of 
Defense shall promptly inform the foreign government of the basis for such action and shall, to 
the maximum extent practicable, assist the foreign government in taking effecting measures to 
bring the responsible members of the security forces to justice. 
 Under this “maximum extent practicable” clause, DOD can investigate and prosecute 
Afghan security forces for gross violations of human rights when the Afghan government is unable 
to do so. Specifically, Afghan security forces that are funded, trained by, and operate alongside 
the U.S. military are subject to DOD prosecution for gross violations of human rights under the 
UCMJ where there is credible information that such violation occurred.  
 a. The UCMJ may be applied to Afghan security forces funded, trained by, and    
 operating Alongside U.S. Forces. 
 Afghan security forces receiving assistance from the U.S. government can be subjected to 
U.S. military prosecution for gross violations of human rights. Article 2(a)(11) of the UCMJ 
states that subject to the provisions of any treaty or agreement to which the U.S. is party to, all 
persons serving with, employed by, or accompanying the armed forces without the continental 
limits of the United States are subject to the code.64 Typically, the UCMJ has no authority over 
civilians.65 In Reid, two murder cases were consolidated to determine the issue of whether 
                                                        
64 10 U.S.C. § 802, Art. 2(a)(11). 
65 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5 (1957). 
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dependents of servicemembers could be subjected to military prosecution.66 Two military 
spouses were tried and convicted of murdering their husbands on foreign military bases; these 
bases were in Great Britain and Japan, respectively.67 Despite treaties with both countries 
allowing military prosecution of servicemembers’ dependents, the Court ruled that dependents 
do not lose their civilian status and constitutional protections afforded to that status, and are 
therefore exempted from military prosecution.68  
 Reid also articulated circumstances where civilians can be subjected to military 
jurisdiction. Civilians may be subjected to the UCMJ under the Executive’s war powers, where, 
in the face of an actively hostile enemy, military commanders necessarily have broad power over 
persons on the battlefront.69 This policy stems from the pre-Constitution notion that 
extraordinary circumstances present in an area of actual fighting have been considered sufficient 
to permit some punishment of civilians in that area by military courts under military rules.70 This 
policy has been extended to civilians more recently, when Congress placed private contractors – 
who accompany U.S. forces into the field – under UCMJ jurisdiction, extending UCMJ 
jurisdiction over civilians not just in times of declared war but contingency operations as well.71 
 Afghan security forces receiving funded, trained by, and operating alongside U.S. forces 
are subject to prosecution under the UCMJ. In contrast the peacetime Britain and Japan (in Reid), 
the United States in involved in a declared war in Afghanistan, where there is actual fighting and 
                                                        
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 3-5. 
68 Id. at 33. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 Peter Singer, Frequently Asked Questions on the UCMJ Change and its Applicability to 
Private Military Contractors, BROOKINGS (Jan. 12, 2007), 
https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/frequently-asked-questions-on-the-ucmj-change-
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the U.S. and its allies are engaging an actively hostile enemy in the Taliban. The extraordinary 
circumstances outlined in Reid are present in the Afghanistan War – where private military 
contractors are already subjected to UCMJ purview. Afghanistan’s government is unable to 
prosecute bacha baz for the following reasons: the judicial system’s lack of expertise and 
experience in the subject of rape; the legal system’s inability to reach the entire country, and; the 
Afghan government’s complicity in the custom. Under these circumstances, Afghan troops 
operating alongside U.S. forces can be subjected to UCMJ prosecution for gross violations of 
human rights. 
 b. Afghanistan’s legal system is inadequately prepared to confront Bacha Bazi. 
 Afghanistan’s justice system is inadequate to investigate and prosecute child sexual abuse 
cases such as bacha bazi. Prior to January 2017, Afghanistan’s anti-trafficking and smuggling laws 
were governed by the country’s 1976 penal code. 72  The 1976 penal code did not explicitly 
criminalize rape, only referencing adultery and pederasty.73 Additionally, there was no discussion 
of consent in the 1976 penal code.74 In January 2017, bacha bazi was explicitly prohibited for the 
first time in the updated anti-trafficking and smuggling law.75 The new penal code is a step in the 
right direction: in an entire chapter penalizing bach bazi, perpetrators can face seven years in jail 
while those who keep multiple boys younger than twelve years old can face life imprisonment.76 
More important to this paper, chapter five of the new penal code details that Afghan national 
                                                        
72 Jared Ferrie, Human Trafficking on the Rise in Afghanistan Despite New Laws, REUTERS 
(Mar. 29, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-afghanistan-humantrafficking-
laws/human-trafficking-on-the-rise-in-afghanistan-despite-new-laws-idUSKBN1H52U8. 
73 Ng, supra note 22 at 230. 
74 Id. 
75 Ferrie, supra note 72. 
76 Sayed Jalal Shajjan, The Revised Criminal Code: an End for Bacha Bazi?, LSE, 
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/southasia/2018/01/24/the-revised-afghanistan-criminal-code-an-
end-for-bacha-bazi/. 
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security forces involved in bacha bazi face imprisonment of up to fifteen years.77 Enforcement of 
the penal code went into effect in January 2018.78 Despite the strengthening of the law, resources 
to enforce it are not available.79 Afghanistan does not have a court dedicated to hearing human 
trafficking cases and there is little public education about trafficking and where victims should 
report it.80 There appears to be a lack of knowledge about rape in general: a survey of convicted 
rapists in the Herat prison indicated that most were unaware that rape was a criminal offense and 
that they would be imprisoned for it.81 
 The U.S. military judicial system is well-equipped to handle cases involving bacha bazi 
and prosecute Afghan security forces engaged in the practice. In contrast to the Afghan penal code, 
the UCMJ has been around for over 200 years, governing the conduct of U.S. servicemembers.82 
The UCMJ has well-defined and outlined trial procedures to its court-martial.83 Competent and 
experienced military judges will hear the case of an Afghan security soldier, and it is likely that a 
Judge Advocate experienced in sexual crimes will be appointed as defendant’s counsel. The UCMJ 
is far better qualified to deal with bacha bazi in the courtroom.  
 c. The Afghan legal system is not present throughout the country. 
 There is also an issue of the justice system’s reach across the country. At present, it is likely 
that Afghanistan’s legal system is unable to operate throughout the country, hampering the 
government’s ability to prosecute human rights abuses by security forces in the rural and tribal 
                                                        
77 Id. 
78 Id. 
79 Ferrie, supra note 72. 
80 Id. 
81 U.N. Off. High Comm’r for Hum. Rts., Silence is Violence: End the Abuse of Women in 
Afghanistan, July 8, 2009, https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/vaw-
english_1.pdf. 
82 History, http://www.ucmj.us/history-of-the-ucm. 
83 Id. 
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areas of Afghanistan. As of August 2017, thirteen percent of Afghanistan’s districts are under 
Taliban control or influence.84 Furthermore, a recent BBC study indicates that the Taliban are 
openly active in seventy percent of the country, with the Afghan government only controlling 112 
districts – thirty percent of the country.85 One of the major weaknesses in the Afghan system for 
addressing gross violations of human rights is that the ministries responsible for prosecuting them 
lack the capability to conduct sophisticated investigations and investigate cases that happened in 
the past.86 This is especially troubling because human rights violation cases often come from the 
remote and rural areas, where there are weak government institutions make investigation and 
prosecution more difficult.87 
 Here, the U.S. military’s legal system is better equipped as well. Throughout U.S. 
involvement in Afghanistan, military investigators have been deployed to Afghanistan to assist in 
the war effort. For example, the U.S. Army’s Criminal Investigation Command (“CID”) has been 
deployed to recover stolen U.S. property from Afghan storefronts 88  and investigate suicide 
bombings.89 U.S. military investigators are likely able to conduct sophisticated investigations in 
rural areas as well. The DOD Leahy language proposal does not allow the U.S. military to 
                                                        
84 Idrees Ali, Taliban Increases Influence, Territory in Afghanistan: U.S. Watchdog, REUTERS 
(Oct. 31, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-afghanistan-militants/taliban-
increases-influence-territory-in-afghanistan-u-s-watchdog-idUSKBN1D026N. 
85 Reuters Staff, Taliban Active in 70 percent of Afghanistan, BBC Study Finds, Jan. 30, 2018, 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-afghanistan-taliban-study/taliban-active-in-70-
percent-of-afghanistan-bbc-study-finds-idUSKBN1FK03C. 
86 SIGAR, supra note 3 at 22. 
87 Id. at 23. 
88 Colby Hauser, CID Special Agents Put Taliban on Notice, U.S. Army CID (Aug. 9, 2011), 
http://www.cid.army.mil/assets/docs/press-
releases/CID%20Special%20Agents%20%20Puts%20Taliban%20On%20Notice.pdf. 
89 Colby Hauser, Special Agent Embraces Unconventional Assignment, U.S. Army CID (Aug. 
12, 2011), http://www.cid.army.mil/assets/docs/press-
releases/Special%20Agent%20Embraces%20Unconventional%20Assignment.pdf. 
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prosecute Afghan security forces for gross violations of human rights in situations where the 
Afghan government is able to.90 
 d. The Afghan government is complicit in Bacha Bazi. 
 The Afghan government cannot be relied upon to confront bacha bazi due to its complicity 
in the practice. The Afghan government has been known to prosecute the victims of bacha bazi as 
opposed to the abusers, while government officials exploit the boys sexually.91  Additionally, 
Afghan security forces are among the largest number of sexual predators.92 As proof of this 
assertion, Jones, in his paper, offers as evidence a Frontline documentary, The Dancing Boys of 
Afghanistan, in which appears video of Afghan police officers fondling young boys.93 Bacha bazi 
is so pervasive among Afghan police that the Taliban is using child sex slaves to mount insider 
attacks in southern Afghanistan.94 Essentially the Taliban are using bacha bazi boys as Trojan 
horses to attract police officers.95 In one such attack, a checkpoint commander and six other 
officers were gunned down by the commander’s sex slave. 96  Bacha bazi is so common in 
Afghanistan that there are estimates that fifty percent of the men in the Pashtun tribal areas of 
Afghanistan take on boy lovers.97 The Afghan government has recently started pursuing criminal 
cases against those involved in bacha bazi, however, the majority of cases are dropped due to 
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perpetrators paying bribes or having relationships with law enforcement officials.98 Furthermore, 
DOD readily admits that the full extent of child sexual assault and other violations of human rights 
happening in Afghanistan may never truly be known.99 Twenty-four of the thirty-seven individuals 
and organizations – current and former servicemembers, contractors, NGOs, journalists – 
interviewed by SIGAR admitted they knew of bacha bazi and child sexual assault.100 According 
to an NGO representative, “Bacha bazi is very sensitive, and those involved are in high positions 
within the Afghan military, which makes going after these individuals very difficult”.101 
 The Afghan government is complicit in bacha bazi and has proven it is not a fair arbiter of 
justice unable to victims child sexual abuse. While the United States has turned a blind eye toward 
human rights violations committed by its partner forces – see discussion in Section IV(b) – it has 
not contributed to the plague of child sexual abuse the way that the Afghan government, and its 
officials, have done. Allowing abusers to remain in positions of power sends a message that the 
safety of children is not an imperative concern of the Afghan government. In dismissing charges 
against sexual abusers, the judicial system displays its corruption and dismissal of the victims. By 
prosecuting perpetrators under the UCMJ, victims are ensured that claims of abuse will be 
investigated thoroughly, prosecuted nobly, and heard fairly. 
 e. The proposed language for 362(a)(3) conflicts with United States legal authority to 
 intervene in Afghanistan and the use of force permitted by current bilateral 
 agreements. 
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 This paper’s proposed policy under an updated DOD Leahy law is inconsistent with the 
United States legal authority to intervene in Afghanistan and the U.S. military’s use of force 
abilities. In 2003, NATO assumed control of International Security Assistance Force (“ISAF”) 
operations in the country. 102  ISAF personnel operated under the 2002 Military Technical 
Agreement (“MTA”) between the ISAF and the Interim Administration of Afghanistan.103 U.S. 
forces operated under a 2003 diplomatic agreement between the U.S. and the interim 
administration.104 The MTA provided that the interim Afghan government had responsibility for 
the security and law and order.105 In 2014, the Afghan government entered into a Security and 
Defense Cooperation Agreement (‘SDCA”) with the U.S., as well as a Status of Forces Agreement 
(“SOFA”) with NATO.106  Both the SDCA and SOFA provide that Afghan law enforcement 
personnel enforce Afghan law and order.107  These two agreements additionally prohibit U.S. 
forces from arresting or imprisoning Afghans and bar operation of detention facility in 
Afghanistan.108 U.S. forces are allowed to, however, detain Afghans for delivery over to Afghan 
authorities in connection with a crime under Afghan law.109 
 Despite the above-described limitations, the U.S. military can still intervene in cases of 
bacha bazi and child sexual abuse. U.S. servicemembers in Afghanistan are governed by the law 
of war, a body of law based on international law and treaties which DOD assets must comply with 
                                                        
102 Inspector General, DOD, Implementation of the DOD Leahy Law Regarding Allegations of 
Child Sexual Abuse by Members of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces, 39, DOD 
(Nov. 16, 2017), https://media.defense.gov/2017/Nov/15/2001843802/-1/-1/1/DODIG-
2018-018_CHILD_SEXUAL_ABUSE_V2_508_R_REDACTED.PDF. 
103 Id. at 39-40. 
104 Id. at 40. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. at 40-41. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. 
 19 
during armed conflict.110 As part of the law of war, the Geneva Convention and its Additional 
Protocols bar sexual assault against civilians. 111  Afghanistan is a member to the Geneva 
Convention and its Additional Protocols, as well as a member to the U.N. Convention on the Rights 
of the Child.112 Afghan security forces therefore have a duty to protect children from sexual abuse 
and violence, and should Afghan security forces engage in child abuse, would be committing a 
crime of both Afghan and international law.113 Under these frameworks, U.S. troops may intervene 
and use reasonable force necessary to prevent the observed sexual assault committed against a 
child by a member of the Afghan security forces.114 
 The bilateral agreements covering U.S. authority in Afghanistan do not sufficiently protect 
victims of bacha bazi. It is clear under the terms of the agreements that U.S. arrest, detention, and 
prosecution of Afghan security forces for gross violations of human rights is prohibited, conflicts 
with this paper’s alteration and interpretation of the DOD Leahy law. As such, I recommend that 
the U.S. alter its bilateral agreements with the government of Afghanistan to allow U.S. 
prosecution of Afghan security forces under the UCMJ where there is credible information that 
the unit committed gross violations of human rights. These prosecutions should be restricted to 
situations where the Afghan government is unable to investigate and prosecute claims of child 
sexual abuse due to the reasons specified in Section III(a)(b)(c). This proposed change in language 
to SDCA and SOFA would likely experience significant backlash from the Afghan government, 
as well as reluctance from the U.S. to alter significant language in bilateral agreements where U.S. 
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servicemembers enjoy immunity from criminal jurisdiction of the host country.115 While these 
issues are noted, the risks and consequences of altering the U.S.-Afghanistan bilateral agreements 
are beyond the scope of this paper. The proposed language reflects the best approach towards 
confronting bacha bazi and protecting its victims. 
 f. The International Criminal Court is an inappropriate venue for prosecution of 
 Afghan security forces for Bacha Bazi. 
 The International Criminal Court (“ICC”) is the inappropriate venue for prosecuting 
Afghan security forces for child sexual abuse. In November 2017, the ICC’s prosecutor requested 
the court’s permission to authorize an investigation into possible war crimes and crimes against 
humanity in Afghanistan since 2003.116 The ICC prosecutor wants to investigate crimes committed 
by Afghan government forces, but by the U.S. military and Central Intelligence Agency.117 The 
ICC relies on its member states to cooperate with investigations, including with access to witnesses 
and crime scenes, and assisting in arrests.118 Afghanistan is a member state and will be relied upon 
should an investigation be approved.119 Additionally, while the U.S. is not a member country, the 
ICC would still have jurisdiction over war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in 
Afghanistan by nationals of non-party states due to Afghanistan’s member status.120 
 The United States is opposed to ICC involvement in Afghanistan; DOD does not accept 
that ICC investigation of U.S. personnel is warranted, and the State Department opposes the court’s 
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involvement in country.121 The U.S. is not member to the ICC due to its fear of U.S. personnel 
being subjected to prosecution for political purposes.122 The conflict between the ICC and the U.S. 
would be an unwelcome development in the fight against bacha bazi. The U.S. would likely 
pressure the Afghan government and its NATO allies to reject an ICC investigation, and refuse 
participation in such investigation should it be warranted. ICC investigation could also lead to a 
drawdown of U.S. troops in Afghanistan, reducing the already limited visibility into the rural and 
contested areas of the country, further preventing reporting of child sexual abuse. ICC prosecution 
of Afghan security forces is inappropriate so long as a proposed investigation will also investigate 
U.S. military forces. 
 In conclusion, for the reasons outlines above, the Leahy laws should be amended to allow 
the U.S. military to prosecute Afghan security forces under the UCMJ for gross violations of 
human rights. 
IV. CONGRESS MUST ENACT STATUTORY AUTHORITY FOR A PRIVATE 
RIGHT TO ACTION UNDER THE LEAHY LAWS 
 To strengthen the enforcement of the Leahy laws, Congress must enact statutory language 
authorizing private right to challenge State and DOD funding of Afghan security forces alleged to 
have committed gross violations of human rights, and where there is credible information the 
violations have occurred. At present, there is no judicial remedy to non-enforcement of the Leahy 
laws.123 In absence of judicial review, bacha bazi victims are left at the mercy of a corrupt legal 
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system and U.S. agencies that are continuing to fund Afghan units committing human rights abuse. 
This section argues that a private right to action under the Leahy laws will provide bacha bazi 
victims an avenue to halt funding to abusers. 
 a. The judiciary cannot currently review challenges to implementation of the Leahy 
 laws. 
 The judiciary cannot review challenges to Leahy law implementation due to the judiciary’s 
deference to the Executive branch in matter of national security and defense. The Supreme Court 
has previously ruled that unless Congress has provided otherwise, the Court is reluctant to decide 
on Executive authority in military and national security affairs.124 In Egan, the respondent was a 
laborer at a Tident Naval Refit Facility; the job that required a security clearance.125 Respondent 
was later removed from his position for failure to receive a security clearance, and challenged the 
removal under the Merit Systems Protection Board.126 The Court overturned the lower court’s 
decision, holding that the protection board did not have authority to review the security clearance 
decision-making process.127 The Court’s decision rested on its opinion that it is the authority of 
the Executive branch to determine which information to classify and who may access such 
information.128 The Court further reemphasized its view that foreign policy is the “province” of 
the Executive, and that courts typically defer to Presidential responsibilities in that arena.129  
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 The Court has extended its deference to the Executive branch to implementation of the 
Leahy laws its history.130 Presently, Abusharar is the only attempt at judicial enforcement of the 
Leahy laws.131 In Abusharar, the plaintiff, a Palestinian-American lawyer, alleged that he owned 
a home in the Gaza Strip which was destroyed in a bombing conducted by the Israeli military.132 
Abusharar additionally asserted that the U.S. government provided the weapons for the bombing, 
and that his brother was killed by the Israeli Army.133 Alleging that Israel had committed gross 
violations of human rights, Abusharar sued to enjoin the U.S. from providing assistance to Israel 
under the framework the State Leahy law.134 The court granted the U.S. government’s motion to 
dismiss, concluding that assistance under the Leahy amendment is a political question not included 
in the district court’s jurisdiction.135 Abusharar was essentially asking the court to render its own 
judgment on a “sensitive area of foreign policy”.136 Furthermore, the court found that because the 
Leahy law contained no private right of action, plaintiff lacked standing to bring the claim.137 
 A congressional statute allowing a private right to action under the Leahy laws would 
strengthen the laws’ enforcement powers. As discussed, the avenue of relief for bacha bazi victims 
leads to Congress, not the courts. Should Congress grant a private action, Afghan sexual abuse 
victims will be able to sue the U.S. over the failure to cut off funding from human rights violators. 
Judicial scrutiny will put pressure on DOD and State to comply with the Leahy laws, and the stop 
of funding to abusers will weaken their power over the community. A private right of action to 
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challenge U.S. foreign assistance may subject all U.S. foreign funding decisions to challenge; 
while this is not the intended result of my proposal, I do recognize the possibility. Such impediment 
to the Executive should not deter Congress from creating this private right; the judiciary decides 
each case on its merits.   
 b. Additional Policy Considerations for a Private Right to Action 
 A private right to action under the Leahy laws provides victims a path to recourse. 
Throughout U.S. involvement in Afghanistan, the U.S. has adopted a policy of ignorance and 
inaction to human rights violations committed by Afghan partner forces. While SIGAR reports 
that it found no evidence U.S. forces were told to ignore human rights138 , published articles report 
different.139 The Times has reported that American soldiers and Marines have been instructed not 
to intervene – even in situations where Afghan allies have abused boys on military bases.140 The 
policy of non-intervention is intended to maintain relations with security units trained to fight the 
Taliban, as well as U.S. reluctance to impose cultural values where bacha bazi is “rampant”.141 
Worse, the U.S. military has taken to reprisals against servicemembers who intervene against 
known abusers in the Afghan security forces.142 Dan Quinn, a former Army Special Forces officer, 
was relieved of command for beating up Abdul Rahman, a U.S. backed militia commander who 
kept a boy chained to his bed as a sex slave, then beat the boy’s mother for notifying authorities.143 
Sergeant First Class Charles Martland, who joined Quinn in beating up the commander, was 
subjected to the Army’s attempt to forcibly retire him for them service.144 Sgt. Martland was able 
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to stay in the Army due to the high-profile backlash against his forced retirement, which included 
the involvement of Congressman Duncan Hunter and the Veterans of Foreign Wars.145 In addition, 
Marine Major Jason Brezler is under investigation for unlawful transmission of classified 
material.146 Brezler’s alleged transmission centers around his email – to Marine officers at Forward 
Operating Base Delhi – regarding Sarwan Jan, an Afghan police commander. 147  Jan was 
previously arrested for corruption, Taliban support, and child abduction.148 Jan made his way back 
onto a U.S. base with a group of “tea boys”, one of whom killed three Marines on base in 2012.149 
DOD has disputed some of the Times article’s allegations, however, an examination of DOD’s 
policy toward human rights reporting violations is just as abysmal. 
 According to SIGAR, DOD did not have any guidance specifically requiring the reporting 
of human rights violations in Afghanistan until November 2011, ten years after the U.S. 
invasion.150 DOD only adopted explicit guidance on reporting gross violations of human rights 
after Congress amended the Leahy law in 2014.151 Additionally, State does not have specific 
guidance and training on reporting incidents involving the sexual abuse of children.152  DOD 
officials do not believe that all child sexual report incidents reflect the extent of the practice in 
Afghanistan; the absence of explicit guidance and training from DOD on reporting child sexual 
abuse before 2015 may have confused servicemembers on what to do on becoming aware of an 
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incident.153 Lastly, due to the drawdown of U.S. forces in the country, DOD and State rely on 
Afghan reports on human rights violations.154 
 A private action under the Leahy laws is necessary due to the failures of the U.S. 
government to protect bacha bazi victims. U.S. servicemembers who intervene face retribution, 
despite authority under the law of war to do so. Despite instances where there is credible 
information of gross violations of human rights, DOD has used the “notwithstanding clause” of 
the Defense Appropriations Act to continue funding of violators. DOD’s long-time absence of 
guidance on child sexual abuse reporting hinders identification of abusers and allows security 
forces to engage in bacha bazi with impunity. While self-reporting is typically a positive, Afghan 
self-reporting must be viewed skeptically. Security forces engaged in human rights violations 
cannot be trusted to police themselves. As such, bacha bazi victims cannot rely on the discretion 
of the U.S. executive, or the policing of Afghan security forces. A private right to action will 
accomplish two goals: (1) allows victims to enjoin funding from forces which use it for the sexual 
exploitation of Afghan boys, and; (2) force U.S. executive agencies to uphold the human rights 
laws Congress has enacted. 
V. CONCLUSION 
 Bacha bazi boys are raped and forced into sexual slavery; the practice is widespread and 
part of the culture of Afghanistan. The United States government has adhered to a non-
interventionist policy for too long, overlooking child sexual abuse committed by Afghan partner 
forces. The Afghan government has proven itself unable and unwilling to combat bacha bazi and 
bring sexual predators to justice. As such, it is the obligation of the United States to prosecute 
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Afghan security forces for gross violations of human rights where there is credible information 
that violations have occurred. U.S. forces are intertwined with their partner forces in Afghanistan. 
These Afghan security forces train and operate alongside the American military; they share the 
same bases and receive funding from the U.S. government. As such, these partner forces become 
representative of the United States, and the ideals our country stands for. We cannot allow troops 
receiving military funding and assistance to participate in bacha bazi and stain the human rights 
America champions. Afghan troops funded, trained by, and operating alongside U.S. forces are 
subject to U.S. military prosecution under the UCMJ, subject to the proposed language of 362(a)(3) 
of the DOD Leahy law. Further, enacting a private right to action to enforce the Leahy laws will 
strengthen enforcement of human rights law, cut funding from human rights violators, and provide 
bacha bazi victims a path to redress. The U.S. has invested heavily in securing Afghanistan a 
brighter future; we are obliged to strive towards ending bacha bazi. 
  
  
 
